Showing posts with label Religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Religion. Show all posts

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Gov. Rick Perry: "Religious Freedom Does Not Mean Freedom From Religion.”



Many of us are familiar with the supposed “war on Christmas” narrative that is propagated by theligious right as most notably put forward by those such as Bill O’Reilly, Rick Perry and Sarah Palin. However, this narrative is but a surface manifestation of a deeper dialogue that Christianity, and Christians are under attack in America. They are under attack by secularism, by liberals, by the LGBTQ community, by atheists, by nonbelievers, by those that seek to create and flourish in a truly pluralistic and multicultural civil society. A few keys issues in this diatribe can be thought of as prayer in public schools, protecting the LGBTQ community from discrimination, taking the word God off our currency and out of the Pledge of Allegiance, not allowing nativity scenes to be placed on public property and so on and so forth. Whatever side of the argument we as individuals may align; we are all, to some extent, familiar with this dialogue however superficially I just presented it.

This past week, on June 13th 2013, Governor Rick Perry thought it necessary to sign into law the “Merry Christmas Bill”. Perry said, "People of faith too often feel they can't express their faith publicly. And if they dare display it, they find themselves under attack from individuals and organizations that have nothing to do with them or their communities for that matter."[1] This law, which goes into effect this coming September, is designed to allow religious displays in schools as long as there is more than one religion being represented or if a secular symbol is present. Whether or not this bill is necessary or appropriate is another question. The much more prevalent issue is that Rick Perry, when introducing this bill, said, “Religious freedom does not mean freedom from religion.” This is a heavy statement that requires a bit of unpacking.


Perry’s remarks reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of human rights and what freedom and religion actually means. A distinction I always find myself making when discussing these issues is that of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. Could you tell me, off hand, what the difference between the two is? It’s actually quite difficult and requires defining the terms. What do we mean when we say freedom of religion? What does religion actually mean here? Would it be appropriate to say it includes the freedom to find meaning, purpose and joy in our lives? If so, religious organizations, tradition and dogma can become irrelevant to leading a “religious” life. Indeed, many people, especially in the past few decades are choosing to shed religious tradition and myth in favor of something more personally fulfilling whether it be a “spiritual but not religious” orientation, or identifying as a humanist or atheist or nonbeliever. This is not new information. I feel that religion is often used in an unfortunately narrow light. I often ask: “what is more religious than your conscience?” What is more religious than critical thinking? What is more religious than following your reason as far as it can take you? Whether someone is a believer or a nonbeliever, having freedom of conscience is the essence of freedom of religion.

Religious freedom is a narrow term and usually comes with narrow understanding. I prefer the term freedom of conscience as it necessary includes alternative and broader ways of understand religion as a mechanism for finding truth, meaning and purpose. Governor Rick Perry is a victim to a false dichotomy. He is a religious zealot fighting for his team against a false enemy. At the basest level, this man is limiting the religious freedom he is trying so desperately to protect. “Freedom of religion does not protect freedom from religion” is an oxymoron. Freedom of religion necessarily includes freedom from religion. This is correctly understood by many as a fundamental human right. For example, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) published an op-ed this past January entitled “Government Must Protect Nonbelievers.” In this essay Katrina Lantos Swett the Chair of USCIRF and Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, a Commissioner of USCIRF, say

While religious freedom is an integral part of our heritage, it also is misunderstood. A key misunderstanding concerns the matter of belief. Simply stated, religious freedom means not only the right to believe, but the freedom to disbelieve — to embrace any religion and to reject every religion. People express their religious freedom by choosing theism, atheism or any other response to ultimate questions. Religious freedom allows them to follow wherever their conscience leads.[2]

Secretary of State John Kerry echoed these remarks this past May. He said,

“Whether it be a single deity, or multiple deities, or no deities at all, freedom to believe —including the freedom not to believe — is a universal human right…But freedom of religion is not an American invention. It’s a universal value. And it’s enshrined in our Constitution and ingrained in every human heart. The freedom to profess and practice one’s faith, to believe or not to believe, or to change one’s beliefs, that is a birthright of every human being.”[3]

Whether it’s Jon Stewart calling it “Bullshit Mountain” or Bill Maher calling it “The Bubble,” Governor Rick Perry certainly lives there. Nonbelievers and secularists, including religious secularists, are continuing to be persecuted for their efforts to create a pluralistic society that protects all people from discrimination. As history has shown the most dangerous forms of discrimination are those that come with the justification of religious dogma and righteousness. Governor Rick Perry’s ignorance and intolerance of human rights and freedom of conscience is a stain upon public policy and a hindrance to the evolution of civil society.




[1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/rick-perry-freedom-from-religion_n_3441187.html?ir=Religion&ncid=edlinkusaolp00000008
[2] http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/whats-new-at-uscirf/3918-op-ed-richomnd-times-government-should-protect-nonbelievers-january-22-2013.html
[3] http://occupydemocrats.com/secretary-of-state-john-kerry-freedom-not-to-believe-is-a-universal-human-right/

Monday, May 7, 2012

Ken Wilber's Sociable God

Some religions are better than others. And some religions are worse. The idea that we cannot judge some religious or spiritual engagements as being better or worse than any other is simply not true. There is a way to discern better or worse or higher or lower engagements. This is the radical idea that Ken Wilber proposes. He offers a new way of looking at religion itself, calling for vertical dimensions of depth. Wilber’s model provides us with a solid base in which to think about religion and human evolution. It also provides a context in which we can examine religious pluralism, particularism and exclusion, as well as religious fundamentalism and violence.

Developmental Hierarchy
Wilber’s ideas are complex and he introduces many terms that may be foreign. I will present his work as clearly and succinctly as possible. Wilber uses a developmental model of nested structural hierarchies. In this hierarchy, Wilber outlines seven stages of human development in three categories: The three subconscious or prepersonal stages are “Archaic”, “Magic” and “Mythic”. The selfconscious or personal stage he calls the “Rational” stage. The three superconscious or transpersonal stages are “Psychic”, “Subtle” and “Causal”. In this development hierarchy, each succeeding stage contains more love, compassion, care, justice, consciousness, rights and so on.  The higher one is in this hierarchy the more likely you will see reduced oppression, prejudice and various “isms”. “The higher one is, the more care and less oppression one is inclined to possess” (8). In this way, we can judge different religious and spiritual engagements. He says,
To the extent that spiritual engagements involve care and consideration for others – and a capacity to take into account perspectives other than one’s own egoic perspective – then to that extent as well, some spiritual engagements are better, truer, deeper, more authentic than others (12).

The term “transpersonal” is a relatively new term, and has been championed mostly in the field of psychology (transpersonal psychology). Wilber defines transpersonal as a “sustained and experimental inquiry into spiritual, or transcendental (transpersonal), or ‘perennial philosophical’ concerns” (58). He says, “it attempts to develop legitimate and reproducible means for differentiating between authentic spiritual experience and merely psychotic, hallucinatory, paranoid, delusional or other abnormal or pathological states” (58). Using this context, Wilber presents a transpersonal sociology; a nonreductionistic sociology of religion.

Pre/Post Fallacy
In order to understand Wilber’s contribution, it is important to point out how he fills the gaps in others theories of religion. Wilber says, a common mistake many make in the field of religion is what he calls the “pre/post fallacy” (pre-rational, and post-rational). “Where development process from pre-X to X to post-X, the pre states and post states, because they are both non-X states, tend to be confused and equated, simply because the appear, at first glance, to be so similar” (14). We either reduce transrational or superconscious states to prerational, infantile fusion (Freud) or we elevate infantile, prerational states to transcendental, transpersonal glory (Romantics).

For the Romantics, the prerational consciousness was deeply spiritual. With the rise of egoic rationality, this early nondissociated state was brutally repressed. In its place, modernity arose and was characterized by fragmentation and alienation. Modernism’s spirituality, if any, was thus shallow. This view depicts millions of people as “having an inferior consciousness and lacking any deep spirituality” (24). Romantics want to remember the positive contributions of previous stages but in doing so they inject characteristics into the magical nondissociated structure that were not really present; elevating them into a transrational perspective. Wilber calls this tendency the “Mistaken Fall”. Those who favor the magical, nondissociated fusion stages tend to see every succeeding stage as a “catastrophic fall from an original paradise.” Likewise, those who see the modern world of science, such as the holy trinity of atheists, as the pinnacle of human development, see the rise of transrational as a regression back to magical superstition. He summarizes it thusly: it is ”tendency to see spirit as being present in one epoch and not in others, instead of seeing spirit present as the entire evolutionary unfolding” (33).

Generally speaking, religious scholars perceive a series of falls of humanity as we transition into the modern and postmodern worlds. Likewise, secular scholars see a progression of enlightenment, an overcoming of superstition with the rise of modernity, science and liberalism (34). Who is right? Wilber says, they are both right and they are also both wrong. Religion, or spirit, has simply moved from magic to mythic to rational on its way to postrational stages. It is ironic that the rise of modernity, secularism and liberalism actually represent an increase in spirit and religious unfolding. Spirit resides now not in myths but in reason and science itself. He says, “there is more spirit in reason’s denial of mythic god than there is in myth’s affirmation of that god…the rational denial of god contained more spirit than the mythic affirmation of god, for the simple reason that it contained more developmental depth” and thus, more spirit or religiosity (35-6). Rationalization is necessary, appropriate, phase-specific and evolutionary. Therefore, it is entirely religious, in the sense that it is an increasingly advanced consciousness. We will return to this later when we discuss the different usages and definitions of religion.

This is a very interesting concept and dynamic. The separation of church and state for example is traditionally perceived in an inherently limiting way. Church usually means the magic or mythic stages of religion, and state means rationality and secularism. Our education systems likewise are liberal-rational in nature. The more educated a person becomes, the less magic and mythic religion they embrace (35). These dynamics depend on a reductionist definition of what religion is and how it is typically related to secularism and rationality.

However, even if our society is largely based on rationality and secular ideals, there will still be large pockets of culture that remain at prerational stages of unfolding. Wilber says there will always be these pockets. “Even if the center of gravity of the world’s population were rational or higher, pockets of prerational culture would continue to exist and must be handled with specific legal, political, and occasionally military means” (35). The constant struggle between religious apologists (whether prerational or postrational) and rational, secular and scientifically minded groups and individuals, is best represented in terms of competition between different stages of human consciousness and evolution. We will return to this idea later.

States/Stages
A person can have a transpersonal/transrational experience no matter what stage of development they are in. This differentiates stages and states. States are transitory and can change at any moment, or through religious/spiritual technologies such as drumming, chanting or the use of psychedelic drugs. However, these states can only be interpreted through the lens of whatever developmental stage on which an individual exists. This not only applies to individuals, but to groups as well. Any given culture/religion has something like a center of gravity or an average mode of consciousness, around which conventional, everyday realities are organized. Foucault would call this the “dominant mode of discourse.” So although any state of consciousness is available to all stages, it is always experienced and interpreted through the cultural lens of whatever stage of development is the current center of gravity. The higher one is on the developmental scale however, the more likely one is able to experience the states of the higher stages.

Wilber wants to stress that all, or even most, of the states that claim to be transpersonal or postrational are actually not. As such, he says that a highly critical and skeptical attitude must be valued. It is unfortunate he says, that skepticism is often confused with a lack of faith. In this sense, the holy trinity (Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens) could not agree more. Religious endeavors cannot be pardoned from criticism.

Transcend and Include
Many of Wilber’s critics are put off by the hierarchical nature of his developmental model. Some claim it connotes an elitist and superior attitude of those in the “higher” stages. The question arises: If a group/culture/religion/nation/individual is in a higher stage of consciousness than another, can that be used as a superiority complex or a justification for oppression and violence? Wilber’s model however is more complex than this. Development through the stages of consciousness constitute a “transcend and include” dynamic. As one progresses to a higher stage, you transcend the previous stages limitations but include its accomplishments. Wilber describes this development as envelopment. It is a “nested hierarchy”, where each higher structure of consciousness is “potentially capable of legitimately criticizing the partiality, but not the phase-specific appropriateness, of it lower predecessors” (69).

As a higher stage begins to emerge it has to pass through the lower for the simple reason that the lower is already there, it already exists. Both stages are initially fused. They are undifferentiated from each other. The growth of the higher stage is, in part, a process of differentiation from that lower level, or vertical transcendence (86). A distorted, or pathological lower stage can thus subsequently determine the health of the following stage of development. The pathologies can be reproduced in a different form. This is not a causal relationship however. The higher stage can often redress the imbalance, offering corrections. Thus, pathologies of lower stages can predispose, but not cause, similar patterns in a higher stage. Likewise, a higher stage can often repress and/or oppress the lower stages.

Wilber’s central question is: Is there a way of determining how to make “sane, compassionate and caring judgments based on degrees of depth, love and inclusion” (38)? The criteria used for this can be called holistic embrace and is inextricably intertwined with identity formation. For example, when my identity expands from me to my family, from my family to my tribe, community, nation, from my nation to all of humanity, and from humanity to all sentient beings without exception, my corresponding capacity for empathy and sympathy increases with each expansion. More and more souls have come into my identity thus increasing my own depth. They are embraced. There are no outsiders, no fragmentation (36-7). In this way we can adjudicate the authenticity of various cultural and religious engagements. A person or group who has extended sympathy and caring for those beyond him/herself has not impoverished his self, but enriched it. This, in Wilber’s view is the pinnacle of individuality, the height of religious engagement and the purpose of the evolution of human consciousness (37).

For a critical sociology of religion, we must be capable of structurally analyzing various religious engagements, and assign them a spot in the hierarchy where we can constantly judge their degree of depth and authenticity. In this way, this or that religious engagement is higher than this or that other religious engagement. A great advantage of this “integral” theory is that it lets “shamans, saints and sages living fifty thousand years ago, or ten thousand years ago, or two thousand years ago, be fully enlightened by the criterion of being one with the entire manifest universe as it existed at that time” (51). One can be authentic in a phase specific manner that is completely in tune with its center of gravity. However, no development or evolution is without its possible pathologies. Cultural evolution is no exception. Our history is full of brutality, repression and oppression. Wilber warns, “whenever the wisdom of a previous stage is forgotten, a pathology results” (31).

Translation/Transformation
If we think of the various levels of structural organization as floors in a tall building,
each floor is itself a deep structure or stage, while the various components on each floor, the furniture so to speak, are surface structures. Movement from one floor to another, between deep structures, is called transformation. Movement of surface structures on each floor, rearranging furniture, is called translation (90). Surface structures are historically conditioned and come with their own wisdom and/or pathology. They are not caused by, but are molded in some degree, by past surface structures. They hold their particular belief systems, ideologies, languages and customs. Deep structures, on the other hand, are relatively a-historical, collective and cross-cultural.

Each stage of development has its respective needs (similar to Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs). Human beings have physical needs, emotional needs, mental-egoic needs, spiritual needs etc. Wilber speaks of the needs specific to each stage as food or “mana”. Adapting to and learning to digest, the food or mana of a particular stage characterizes the translation aspect of the growth and development process. The current structure must provide this food, or it will perish (84). There is both good mana, and bad mana. The higher the stage one is on, the more likely you will have access to higher, or better, food-truth (this does not deny, however, the validity of phase-specific lower truths). Translation has one major function – “to integrate, stabilize and equilibrate its given level” (92). When a stage can no longer provide this function through providing the necessary food/mana, it yearns for transcendence, to go beyond its level. This is the one major function of transformation. This dialectic and tension between translation and transformation “constitutes much of the dynamic of development” (92). Wilber calls this “(r)evolutionary structuralization.”

Legitimacy/Authenticity
Legitimacy describes how well a spiritual movement or religion facilitates translation (“how well a spirituality provides meaning, integration and value at a particular level”). Authenticity quantifies how well a spiritual movement facilitates transformation (“how well a spirituality promotes transformation to higher levels altogether”). Legitimacy can be referred to as a horizontal scale of development. Authenticity, on the other hand, would be the vertical dimension of growth. There are different degrees of authenticity. Likewise, there are ways to adjudicate those degrees of depth. Wilber describes it thusly, there is both self and other. This separation causes a fear a trembling of the self. It is faced with the existential fact of death and represses it. This is the ultimate repression. This existential situation leads to the creation of immortality symbols or projects. These projects somehow promise to transcend death, and in the process create a “codified system of death denial” (95). Immortality projects are a part of surface structures, of translation to a given stage. They determine that stages legitimacy for meeting its needs. The higher one goes on the developmental scale, the less and less compensatory these projects become. Thus, in order to transform to the next level of structural organization, an individual must accept the death that is present at its current level of adaptation. The self must cease to identify with that level. Wilber says,
Only when the self is strong enough to die to that level can it transcend that level. The self can begin to identify with the new level and begin its own translative process. As the self adapts it begins to face a new ‘other’ and thus will suffer new death-seizures and therefore create new defense measures and new immortality projects (96).
Each transformation is a process of death and rebirth; death to the old level, the old self, and rebirth to the newly emergent level, the new self as identified with new surface structures. Gauging authenticity of an individual, group, or movement becomes a process of judging the facilitation, effectiveness and level of encouragement in this process. How can one go beyond fear, beyond the existential reality of death repression? Wilber answers by saying that you can go beyond this fear and trembling by transcending the dynamic of self and other altogether, by transcending subject and object. Only through shedding the self and widening our spectrum of identification can we grow.

Definitions/Usages of the Term “Religion”
There are at least a dozen different meanings of the word religion that point to a dozen different functions. When we speak of religion, especially in academia, we need to be careful in our usage as different understandings and connotations abound. Religions oppress, and they liberate, at any given moment which function of religion are we referring to? Wilber discusses nine different definitions. Each definition/usage is legitimate, but we must specify our meaning. It is all to common to slip back and forth between meanings and usages to serve current purposes but that can ultimately lead to faulty conclusions. The usages are organized thus: rd-1, rd-2 and so on.

Rd-1: Religion as nonrational engagement.
This usage can have both positive and negative connotations. Religion, in this treatment, deals with nonrational but valid aspects of human life such as faith and grace. It might be an important and even vital aspect of being human (homoreligious as Armstrong would say) but it is not considered real cognition. This can include both the prerational and postrational stages and functions of religion. In this usage, science and rationality are not religious, nor can they be.

Rd-2: Religion as extremely meaningful or integrative engagement.
Religion in this light is a “functional activity”. It is active in its search for meaning and integration. This usage is thus a mechanism of translation. How does religion reflect a given developmental stages search for food or mana? In this way, secularism is a valid religion. Purely rational enterprises are religious in nature in that they, like all levels, are “in search of their phase-specific mana, and this mana-search-on whatever level, high or low, sacred or secular-is understood as religion” (99). Rd-1 and rd-2 can even be contradictory depending on the usage, but both are acceptable if we understand the different functions of religion properly.

Rd-3: Religion as an immortality project.
Using the term defined earlier, religion is seen as a “wishful, defensive, compensatory belief, created in order to assuage insecurity/anxiety” (99). Religion serves an existential need. In this way, it is also serving the needs of translation in each stage. As in rd-2, rationality is also a valid religious endeavor. Science and reason do for the “rational ego exactly what myth does for the childish ego and magic does for the infantile ego” (100). In each case, religion helps to veil the existential anxieties of death. It gives an individual or group something to hold onto, to cling to in the face of impending death of the self.

Rd-4: Religion as evolutionary growth.
In this view, all evolution, history and human development is a process of “increasing realization”. Religion becomes the term for the transformation process itself. The drive for transcendence is religion. It is not a function of translation, of adapting to a given level, or mana searching, but of dying to that level altogether in pursuit of higher structures.

Rd-5: Religion as fixation/regression.
This is the standard primitivization theory. Religion is not nonrational, it is prerational; it is magic and myth. It is usually always derogatory. We will discuss primivitization theory later.

Rd-6: Exoteric religion.
This is usually constituted of the preparatory aspects of religion that allow for higher, inward and/or advanced practices. Belief systems can fall into this category. They can invoke and/or support faith.

Rd-7: Esoteric religion.
This is comprised of the advanced practices mentioned above in rd-6. These practices culminate or at least have a goal or facilitating mystical or peak experiences, which we will discuss momentarily.

Rd-8: Legitimate religion.
This would be a religion that primarily functions in translation processes by providing good mana. It must provide meaning and immortality symbols. This is similar to rd-2. However, rd-2 refers to mana in general, whereas rd-8 refers to good mana religion only. It is legitimate in its capacity to provide good mana. Rd-2 can provide bad mana. Providing bad mana can be characterized as a crisis in legitimacy, when a religion fails in its integrative and defensive functions. Wilber’s example is that of the Catholic church and human reproduction. Their official, and traditional stance is long outdated and has lost legitimacy in the context of the rational secular religion that has emerged.

Rd-9: Authentic religion.
This religion validates transformation processes. A crisis in authenticity occurs when an existing stage or paradigm is challenged by an emerging, higher stage of development. Wilber says, “authentic religion is any practice leading to a genuine emergence of, and eventual adaptation to, those transpersonal realms” (102).

With all of these usages/definitions of religion, there are two different degrees of validity. There is the horizontal scale and the vertical scale. There is both legitimacy and authenticity. Legitimacy is the degree “of translative smoothness and integrity, measured against the potential capacity of the given level itself” (103). Authenticity is the “degree of transformative power, measured by the degree of hierarchical structuralization delivered by the transformation” (103). Each of these definitions has its appropriate place. But we must specify which we mean at any given time, otherwise statements such as “All religions are true,” and “the religious impulse is universal,” or “all religions are one at some deep level,” are misleading, meaningless and false.

Belief, Faith, Experience and Adaptation
For Wilber, the differences between belief, faith, experience and adaptation are extremely important. Religious belief is considered the lowest form of religious engagement. Codified belief systems, he says, often “operate with no authentic religious connection whatsoever” (105). They mostly serve as an oasis of immortality symbols. It is usually an “ideological nexus” that stipulates the means, or qualifications, for immortality.  Questioning impulses are often not allowed to stay in these systems long. As a result, they are often projected onto others and attacked as something outside the self, outside the system. Wilber states,
The true believer is forever on the make, looking for converts and battling disbelievers, for, on the one hand, the mere existence of a disbeliever is one token less in the immortality account, and, on the other, if the true believer can persuade others to embrace his ideology, it helps to quiet his own disbelieving impulses (106).
However, belief can serve as an expression and codification of a higher degree of religious involvement as in rd-6. In this way, they can be authentic belief systems, but only when “linked to actual higher (authentic) religiousness” (106).

A person of faith will usually have a set of beliefs, but their involvement is not predominantly generated by these beliefs. A person of faith usually cannot actually say why they are “right” or has faith. Beliefs have become secondary to something else. Faith confers a measure of peace and inner stability as doubt is now accepted. It plays an integral part in faith. However, there are usually only two ways to deal with doubt. One is to revert to mere belief, to clothe it in “more rigid and external forms” such as immortality symbols, and the other is to act on the yearning for greater closeness with the divine and to advance to experience.

Religious experiences, or “peak”/mystical experiences, provide a temporary insight into one of the transpersonal stages. They go beyond simple faith into an actual encounter, albeit brief. Faith is conducive to these experiences. Beliefs seem to inhibit them. When they occur, they may effect a conversion experience, where one adopts a belief system in which to make sense of their experience. In transpersonal psychology this is called either a “spiritual emergence”, or a “spiritual emergency” depending on whether the ego has the capacity to integrate whatever may come up in the experience. Wilber says, “If an authentic peak experience occurs to a mythic-religious true believer, it often has the awkward effect of energizing his or her mythic immortality symbols. The result is a ‘born again’ believer” (108). This can be said to occur to a great number of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians.

William James, in his book Varieties of Religious Experience, posited that the fundamental religiousness came not from belief, or from faith, but from experience. The world religions, he claimed, began as experiences that were then codified into belief systems that faith was then based around. That paradigm, according to Wilber, blinds us to the fact that it is possible to actually adapt to these higher realms in a permanent and stable fashion. They are not fleeting experiences. Authentic religion is then a process of “concrete developmental transformation and structural adaptation” (111).

One way to understand this developmental model is through the lens of perspectivism, a capacity to “take the role of others, to cognitively project oneself into a mental perspective and viewpoint other than one’s own” (113). Each stage is increasingly capable and thus has more empathy, compassion and care for others. This is not a new idea. Increasing perspectivism, which can also be viewed as “decreasing egocentrism, is a primary indicator of development.” A person can distance themselves from societies norms in this fashion can choose what to accept and what to reject. Whatever decision is made, it is not blind obedience or conformity. A community thinking the same way, sharing the same symbols and worshiping the same god, for example, characterizes the mythic mentality. The rationality paradigm, on the other hand, says to do different things together, to share different symbols and exchange perspectives. In this way, those in the rational stage of development have a greater capacity for both legitimate and authentic religious engagement, in that they have a more sophisticated perspectivism (115). Wilber’s point here is to challenge scholars who have continuously posited rationalism, secularism, modernism and liberalism as an anti-religious trend. For Wilber, they are not just religious but authentically religious in that they represent higher levels of structural adaptation. It’s overall scheme, according to Wilber, may be to strip “infantile and childish associations, parental fixations, wish fulfillments, dependency yearnings, and symbiotic gratifications” (115). In this way, spirit can be approached as spirit itself, rather than as a cosmic parent. Rationalization then is not just a step in the right direction, but is a prerequisite of transrational stages of development. 

This applies well to primitivization theory, which states that religion is prompted by fixations or regression back to infantile magic or childish myth. This theory, championed by Freud, is characterized by Oedipal object-relation and is susceptible to paternal externalizations and projections as well as patriarchal introjections. The problem here is obvious, if fails to address all, if not most of the essentials components of religion and religious experience (62). It is an extremely reductionistic view of religion. Wilber says, “If we treat religion as a structure among other structures and not something shared by them all, then increasing historical development clearly shows an eventually decreasing religiosity” (73). If we follow this way of thinking, the rational-scientific stage is the pinnacle of development and thus of religion. Religion would have no choice but to fall into the realm of the primitivizationists and traditional psychoanalysts, being nothing more than fixation and regression as the holy trinity posits.

There are really only two ways we can navigate this debacle. First: evolution and development is in fact devolution. There actually existed a historical Garden of Eden from which we have fallen and continue to fall from. The rise of modernity, secularism and liberalism are seen as evidence of this fall. Many fundamentalists have this view. If this is true, then the earlier stages of development were actually higher. Second: there are stages of structuralization that are higher and better than the rational-scientific stage. Human and religious evolution and development is still taking place (74), moving into the transpersonal stages.

Thursday, April 26, 2012

Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism


The very basis of state building, historically, has been based on exclusion, both internal and external. In order to form a nation-state, you had to somehow manage a wide variety of different communities, values, ethnicities, religions etc. Anthony Marx, in his book Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism says, the “’collective solidarity’ of nationalism emerges when a population ‘is perceived as essentially homogenous,’ with any ‘crisis of identity’ thereby resolved” (21). In order to create such homogeneity, certain groups were favored and identified with at the expense, disadvantage, and often oppression, of other groups. When nation states were emerging, they were vulnerable and lacked widespread support. Marx says, “to avoid being disempowered or defeated by those competing groups aligning, the state may forge an alliance with one group, which is solidified by the exclusion of a different group from specified rights and reinforced prejudice of that other…states can solidify their support by transgressing the rights of one group to the advantage of the other group” (22). The ultimate goal of this exclusion was to create mass support for the nation, based on what we are not; based on creating an “other”.

Internal discord of competing groups was thus dealt with through selective domestic exclusion. “Demarcating, demonizing, and depriving ‘outsiders’ found within provides a referent that can further unify and solidify the support of the in-group” (23). Elites and/or commoners, eager to build solidarity and cohesion within their group, purposefully magnified even minor differences. “Such exclusion is evident in informal discrimination, state policies of citizenship, forced assimilation, expulsion, or eradication” of that created “other” (24). Thus nationalism has been internally exclusive along existing cleavages of race, gender, ethnicity, class and for our purposes, religion.

Marx says, “Religion…was the primary basis of mass belief and solidarity. Faith provided both a template for popular engagement, which state rulers or their opponents sought to emulate in the secular realm” (25). Religion was the perfect rift for nascent nation-states to focus on. Conflict between groups enraged existing religious passions. Religious groups were torn and pulled in varying directions. Fighting for power synchronized faith and politics. Religion became increasingly involved to nation-state building. As religious communities waged war with competing religions, it becomes more than a religious community, it become a political community (26).

Excluding others became the basis for increasing cohesion. Resulting cultural identifications then focused on secular obedience, however indirect. Regardless of secular aims, the power remained with religion. Internal exclusion, however, had external consequences. Aggravation with foreign enemies, who formed their nation-states on similar exclusionary practices, was reinforced. External enemies became extensions of the internal heretical traitors. “Repetition of this exclusionary process would and still does feed ongoing antagonisms and conflict” (32). We are of course aware of group identification and in-group/out-group dynamics. However, Marx’s work shows that religion played a central role in the early exclusionary practices of nation-states themselves. As Sam Harris so eloquently said, “religion is one of the great limiters of moral identity, since most believers differentiate themselves, in moral terms, from those who do not share their faith. No other ideology is so eloquent on the subject of what divides one moral community from another” (176).


Thursday, April 5, 2012

Rodney Stark, One True God

In One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism, Rodney Stark presents many interesting ideas about how to view religion, particularly monotheism as it relates to pluralism and religious civility. Stark can be described as an apologist, meaning he defends religion saying that it has many beneficial and in fact necessary functions for human beings as individuals and for society as a whole.



I have many criticisms of Stark, particularly around his narrow view of both sociology and more importantly, religion, which is highly reductionist. His definition of religion is as follows: it “consist[s] of explanations of the meaning of existence based on supernatural assumptions and including statements about the nature of the supernatural” (15). What Stark fails to incorporate in this definition is that many religions do not occupy their time, literature and practice around answering supernatural questions. In fact, the Buddha refused to answer such questions, saying simply that they did not matter, that suffering exists regardless and that is where focus should be. But Stark does not see any value in what he calls “godless” religions. He says, “godless religions are unable to gather a mass following” (10) and thus, “for a sociologist, the godless forms of Taoism, Buddhism, or Confucianism are of very limited interest, for they exist primarily as writing, not as human activities” (12). He neglects these traditions simply because they do not fit into his model, the provide complications to not only his definition of religion but to his application of criticism to it. And to say that they do not offer a mass following is an absurd statement for a sociologist as there are over 700 million followers of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in the world. Nevertheless, this is not the focus of his book and should not take away from the valid points he makes within his model.

Monotheism, for Stark, is inherently exclusivist. If there is only one God, then anyone who worships other gods is simply wrong. That’s a simple logical conclusion right? Well, it’s more complicated. One owes it to followers of other, false gods to show them the error of their ways; one must bring them into the light and show them the truth, not only as an obligation to oneself but as an obligation to the one true God. Another word used to describe monotheism is particularism, which is “the belief that a given religion is the only true religion” (116). This Stark says is inherent to monotheism. There are two sides to particularism: contempt for other faiths and reactions by those held in contempt. Other faiths are in competition, each espousing their version of the one true God. Each then feels attacked by the others, needing to defend and protect itself, to defend and protect truth itself. Stark then says that both internal and external conflict is inherent to particularistic religion (117).  The best example of this is heresy, a word used very little in modern times and usually used only to describe events and attitudes in the past, but however is still ever present in religious discourse however politically incorrect it seems to be. Stark says, internal and external “disputes are the normal consequences of theological study, for heresy is inherent in the act of seeking to fully understand and to reconcile the deeper meanings of scriptures and revelations within any context wherein there can be only one correct answer” (118). Monotheism, then, has two clear social aspects, to inspire conflict both internally and externally and to sustain intense solidarity within groups. In group/out group dynamics once again play an important role.

Stark’s criticisms can be applied well to international affairs. Pluralism he says, is a natural effect of the diversity of religious demand. Other things being equal, there will always be a corresponding diversity in religious supply. “However,” he says, “if there exist only a few very powerful religious groups, intense conflicts must ensue as they attempt to suppress the other(s).” The only way a religious organization can maintain a monopoly is to enlist the coercive power of the state. Sound familiar yet? Heresy, then becomes treason. Religious diversity itself, anything that attacks its power and influence, is seen as a threat to the state, to the social order as well as an attack on the one true God. Societies under threat from religious monopolies will not, and indeed, cannot develop a truly pluralistic religious situation until they must do so of their own accord and necessity. Unfortunately, this is a truly revolutionary notion for American foreign policy.

Starks conclusion is as follows: religious apathy and alienation, and more importantly, the potential for religious conflict, prevail in societies where one religious body maintains a monopoly. The answer to this, he says, is to increase level of local religious commitment and religious civility. This is done through religious pluralism, this is done through more religion, not less. This is an interesting conclusion coming from someone who points out the inherent danger of religion to be violent and inspire conflict. He did however discuss secularism a little. He cited Peter Berger’s idea of the Sacred Canopy. This idea is similar to Foucault’s idea of the Dominant Mode of Discourse. It provides meaning, plausibility and legitimacy to the norms and social arrangements to the society beneath it. Religion provides a sacred vision of the cosmos, in turn, creating a sacred canopy for those underneath its vision. How then, does this compete with other canopies created by a pluralistic socity? Stark says the sacred canopy “must not be associated with any specific religious faction but must transcend and overarch them all, thereby being immune from mutual contradiction” (246). Secularism and democracy have been infused with sacredness, ranging from the American way of life and the constitution, to the Declaration of Independence. People he says, can maintain the conventions of religious civility in a pluralistic society yet also retain full commitment to a particularistic canopy. Navigating these waters, as you can see, can become quite messy. The question must be raised: is this notion of religious civility and tolerance merely superficial to those under a particularistic umbrella? My personal answer is yes, and no. The ratio is the variable. 

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Who Knows More About Religion?

After spending some time on pew forum I found some interesting statistics.  There seems to be a definite pattern among these surveys. 
Jews, Mormons and unbelievers tend to know more about religion. Unbelievers scored the highest in the Religious Knowledge Survey, followed by Jews and Mormons. 
Mormons and Evangelical take the top two slots in knowledge of Christianity but followed closely by unbelievers. However, Jews and unbelievers know more about other religions.
I must admit, i did not know the bottom three facts but I suppose most people don't.
Now here is an interesting stat. The more education one receives the more one is likely to have greater religious knowledge. Jews, in general tend to be well educated. Mormons have BYU where they, thankfully, receive education in other religious traditions. But nonbelievers are a hard demographic to pin down. Is there are correlation between level of education and inclination towards religious affiliation and belief? Perhaps. If so, is this why people like Rick Santorum, and religions like Jehovahs Witnesses, are critical of secular, liberal education? Because, the more you know, the more you question? Because the more ideas you are exposed to, the more you are taught to think critically, the more skeptical you become of superstition? Perhaps. They have a term in social psychology called 'social polarization' that may fit well in this scenario. It says that with any group, nation, religion, or demographic, the more closed off they are to outside information, the more secluded from other ideas and worldviews they are, the more extreme their own beliefs and worldviews become. This can be applied to foreign affairs with nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia that limit the influence other cultures, especially the West, has on their own and it can also be applied to home schooling within the U.S. (as we are all aware that the vast majority of homeschooling is done in the name of religion; to protect children from the secular, religious agenda that threatens them with reason and evidence and critical thinking and a propensity toward pluralism and a celebration of diversity.

Monday, March 19, 2012

Texas - One State Under God

Texas has a new license plate. It features the three Crosses at Calvary and says "One State Under God."
These license plates are made to benefit a Christian ministry in East Texas. Opponents of the plate claim, and rightfully so, that this is a clear and blatant government endorsement of religion. Advocates, however, claim that this is an expression of religious speech protected under the first amendment. The DMV is a public institution. It is completely facilitated by the state. Of course we have the protection of free speech which includes the expression of religious speech. If people wanted to express their religious free speech with the various automobiles, they can use bumper stickers, which many do. Using a license plate, given by the state and for state purposes is a clear violation of separation of church and state. In addition, having the proceeds go to a religious organization makes it even more transparent. The state cannot sponsor a religious organization. Period.

Monday, March 5, 2012

Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka

 Mark Juergensmeyer discusses a new cold war, a clash of what he calls two ideologies of order, between religious and secular nationalism.  Western secularization and modernization are seen as a direct threat to a more traditional ideology of order, that of religion. In many cases, secularization and modernization are seen merely as the continuation of western colonialism.  The role religion and ideology play in politics cannot be overlooked or underestimated.  In societies divided along religious and ethnoreligious lines, this drama is necessary to explore.  I will present an overview and examination of the role of religion and ideology in the divided society of Sri Lanka.  Religion and ideology in politics more generally must be explored in addition to various issues associated with deeply divided societies.  To understand this drama, different factors and frameworks are necessary for a thorough examination.  First I will explore religion and fundamentalism more broadly.  The case of Sri Lanka will then be presented and examined in light of various approaches to comparative politics.  The lenses of political culture, the role of elites and institutions will be utilized.
Fundamentalisms
Fundamentalism is inherently reactive to secularization and modernization influences.  It is foremost concerned with the erosion and displacement of religion in society.  Religions proper role has been diminished and replaced.  To understand religious nationalism, we must first understand religious fundamentalism.  In Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Marty and Appleby (1995) present a brief overview of the ideological foundations of fundamentalism.  It is dualistic in nature.  The world outside is contaminated and the world inside is pure.  These boundaries are strict.  There are the sinful and the saved, the righteous and the wicked.  These groups offer perfect purity to its members, and in doing so they are absolutists in nature, meaning they believe in inerrancy.  They have the path to liberation or nirvana and offer sanctum from the contaminated, sinful world outside their community.  They are highly concerned with education systems of the secularized world and thus seek to censor information, protecting civil society from corruption.  Behavior deemed sinful is clearly outlined and must be strictly regulated.  The intervention of the secular state in the religious sphere is the primary concern. 
There is a difference various religions have in how they conceptualize time.  There are two kinds of time, historic and messianic.  Historic is open-ended, amenable to gradual reconstruction and transformation.  In messianic time, however, the need is approaching fast and enemies are about to be conquered at any moment.  What role are they to play then if the end is approaching?  Fundamentalists will answer to messianic time through four different patterns of interaction with the world: conquering, transforming, renouncing or creating.  Each of these corresponds also with how to abolish their enemies.  Only two are relevant to our examination of Sri Lanka, the conqueror and the transformer. 
The conquerors seek to eliminate enemies altogether.  They desire to assume control of the structures of society that give life to their enemy.  They are then in a position to define and dominate outsiders, eliminating them, placing them in cultural, political or geographic exile, or converting them forcibly to their cause.  They seek to suppress all alternative visions and movements.  The transformer differs slightly.  They seek to interpret and influence the structures, institutions, laws and practices of a society, so that opposing fundamentalism may become more difficult, and so that conditions become more favorable for the conversion or marginalization of the enemy.  They seek to reform society to its image, but will adopt accommodating strategies with relaxed boundaries and shades of grey.
Sri Lanka – History and Background
Appleby and Marty (1995) outline three characteristics found in the majority of ethnic confrontations.
1.   There are sharp external boundaries and defined territories.  Claims are based on a historical continuity in identification with blood and culture.
2.   Notions of superiority and supremacy bolster the sharp external boundaries. There is thus a sacred basis for nationalist exclusivism.
3.   Utilization of dramatic and confrontational tactics.
Sri Lanka is characterized by the conqueror fundamentalist trend and clearly embodies these three characteristics.  Their unique historical context complicates matters by their background of deep ethnic tensions.  The Sinhala-Buddhist majority is reacting not only to the threats of modernization and secularization, particularly from their colonial past, but also against the threat of the Hindu Tamils emigrating from southern India.  They are seeking to repossess the northern parts of Sri Lanka from the Hindu Tamils.  And the Tamils seek to establish their own separate state on the island.
          Sri Lanka experienced more than four centuries of Dutch, Portuguese and British influence.  Colonial rule had near complete control of their education systems, threatening the survival of Buddhist culture and traditions.  One Buddhist bhikkhu said, “Those politicians who use English language and British customs and force the British political system on us continue colonialism in Sri Lanka as surely as if the British never left” (Juergensmeyer, 1993, 100).  In the late 19th century, Buddhism began to experience a revival.  Buddhist schools began to be encouraged.  Angarika Dharmapala in 1891 started a revivalist journal seeking to create a moralistic and nationalistic Buddhism.  He died in 1933.  Four years later S.W.R.D. Bandaraike founded Sinhala Maha Sabha, a Buddhist revivalist political party.  A Buddhist Commission of Inquiry was formed and they issued a report entitled the ‘Betrayal of Buddhism’, which sought to examine the ways British colonial rule suppressed and discriminated against Buddhism.  This report had a huge influence on the 1956 elections which brought about a movement to make Sinhalese the official state language.  Resistance from the Tamils culminated in the bloody language riots of 1957.  Coupled with urbanization, industrial growth and rising economic inequality, class antagonism began to rise.  All these factors led to extreme political polarization.  Violence and intimidation became an acceptable aspect of political life as the government became more intrusive and authoritarian.  The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) fought for a separate Tamil state in the north which led to an explosion of violence in the 70s.
          Dharmapala’s leadership demanded that Theravada Buddhism rid itself of foreign influence, purging any synthesis of Buddhism with other faiths or practices (Hindu gods etc), and returning to the simplicities, the ‘fundamentals’ of Buddhism.  Their attention was geared towards reviving Buddhist culture and traditions suppressed by British colonialism and the Hindu and Islamic threats resulting from the Tamils in the north.  In other words, they were concerned with anti-imperialism and ethnonational preemptiveness.  The Tamils were perceived as evil.  Sharp ideological boundaries were drawn and enforced.  The emergence of aggressive Hindu nationalism has only fed their paranoia and reinforced their need to oppose them.  They were an imminent threat to the very survival of their culture, traditions and beliefs and thus must be fought by any means.  The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Peoples Liberation Front, became the most active Sinhala Buddhist movement.  They regarded the secular government as an “obstacle to social progress” (1993, 104).  They were savage in their tactics, killing hundreds, some say thousands of rural villagers in an attempt to control rural areas and undermine the legitimacy of the government.  Most of their targets however, were government officials in what amounted to a Sinhalese holy war.  In 1988, they boycotted elections and vowed to continue their violent resistance until a Sinhalese Buddhist state was created.  In January 1989, eight candidates for parliament seats were dragged out of their homes and murdered.  They demanded the immediate departure of all Indians from Sri Lanka, civilian and military.  This militancy was handled brutally through government repression and authoritarianism. 
The government’s poor organization and lack of capacity to handle these issues effectively led to reactive social and political movements.  Their political parties have little substance and followings, resulting in fragmentation of religious and political authorities.  This theme will be touched on later in respect to elites.  The outcome, in summary, is that Sri Lanka is deadlocked into a pattern of violence feeding violence based around religious and ethnic differences.
          The Sinhala Buddhists must sustain and fortify its niche in society in order to defend itself from alien, penetrating forces of both the Tamils and secularization.  They must strike violently out at the enemy as they encounter ideological and cultural resistances in a growing pluralist, secularized society.  They clearly can be defined as exhibiting the world conqueror fundamentalist model.  The question is however, what variables exacerbate these divides, and what approaches can be taken to mitigate these patterns in the political culture, their institutions and the role of elites?
Political Culture and Ideology
          Both religious and secular nationalism, according to Clifford Geertz, are cultural systems, and thus are both ideologies.  As such, a brief exploration of ideology is required to understand how they function in society.  Ideology is a key feature to explore simply because it provides meaning to both individuals and to society as a whole.  Geertz says, “the function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful” (1997, 218).  People are guided emotionally and intellectually by unexamined biases.  When these biases are religious in nature and provide them with a sense of purpose and meaning they are advanced with great passion and little compromise.  Ideologies are thus crucial as sources of sociopolitical meanings and attitudes. 
When society is unable to have a coherent political orientation, ideologies provide images of the political process.  Geertz asserts that there are currently two approaches to the study of the social determinants of ideology: the interest theory and the strain theory.  The interest theory is characterized by a background of universal struggle for power, influence and advantage.  The strain theory is characterized by a background of an effort to correct sociopsychological disequilibrium.  These two theories are not mutually exclusive and can both be present in an ideological framework (1997, 201).  Structural problems and maladies are felt on the individual level as personal insecurity.  “For it is in the experience of the social actor that the imperfections of society and contradictions of character meet and exacerbate one another” (1997, 204).  Thus, other institutional variables and inefficiencies of the state can create grievances that catalyze ideological reactions.  “Ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role.  It provides a symbolic outlet from emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium” (1997, 204). 
Ideological movements can thus be explained as catharsis.  Emotional tension can be drained off by being displaced onto symbolic enemies, which in turn provides a legitimate justification for hostility.  They can also be explained through individuals and groups legitimizing their actions in terms of adherence to higher values or higher purposes.  The role of civil society here is of the upmost importance.  “It makes a great deal of difference if a society [has] independent trade unions, civic associations, communications media, and political parties, capable of draining off anxiety and resentment in response to social and economic crises, and converting them into secular politics and public policy” (Appleby 1995, 434).  The reduction of civil society by interventionist states thus becomes a stressor, forcing individuals and groups to react ideologically. 
Meaning-making cannot be ignored in divided societies.  Ideology plays a crucial role in the environment in which healing must take place and new institutions must be forged.  Whatever replaces these ideologies must provide similar sociopsychological purposes.  The clash of ideologies, Geertz explains, may bring a given problem to attention, but it may also give it a powerful, passionate charge so that it may no longer be possible to deal with it rationally.  A political environment must then serve the purpose of managing these clashes effectively while simultaneously providing a sense of order and meaning.
Juergensmeyer offers a solution to this problem in his essay The New Religious State.  Religious nationalists, he says, are striving for a political order based on religious values.  They operate on the assumption that religion can replace liberal democracy by providing the “ideological glue” that holds a state together.  Religion, and secularism, according to Juergensemeyer are two competing “ideologies of order.”  Both have the ability to command communal loyalty and legitimize authority.  Both conceive the world around them as coherent and manageable, suggest levels of meaning beneath the mundane world, provide identity and provide authority that give social and political order a reason for being.  And both define how individuals should act and relate people to the larger social network.  
The West has had a long historical dialogue between secularism and religion.  Accommodating religion in the developing world is proving much more difficult.  Juergensmeyer says, “given religious histories that were part of national heritages, religious institutions that were sometimes the nations’ most effective systems of communication, and religious leaders who were often more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials, religion could not be ignored” (1995, 384).  The government of Sri Lanka needs Sinhalese support but also cannot afford to alienate the Tamils and other minority groups.  This dynamic, leads to what is called, a double frustration; leaders are considered traitors by both religious and secular communities by making compromises.  Both feel that behind the compromises lie an inherent bias and loyalty.  Juergensmeyer believes, however, that it is possible to form an alliance and balance between these two ideologies.  The clashes between them can create new possibilities for accommodation and synthesis, forming the new religious state. 
Institutions
There are many institutional variables to take into account such as the electoral process and rules of political competition.  According to Alfred Stepan, having free and contested elections is a necessary condition for the successful transition to democracy.  To be considered free and contested, certain institutional guarantees must be met: the freedom to join and form organizations, the freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, access to alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (2001, 216).  In addition, the constitution must have some measure of protection for minority rights.  All groups must have the right and capability to advance their interests.  Sri Lanka obviously does not meet all these requirements.  How then can we create certain institutional rules of the game that can lead to these results?
In the West, Stepan says we carry an assumption: for democracy to flourish we need a strict separation of church and state. This is a false assumption.  Before states can be considered a democracy they must first be crafted for what he calls the “twin tolerations,” meaning that minimal boundaries of freedom must be crafted for political institutions by religious authorities and vice versa.  The dynamic between religion and politics, according to Stepan, lies not in church-state separation but in the construction and reconstruction of the twin tolerations, a kind of dialectic forming a new synthesis again and again.  For this to occur, he believes religions must possess multivocal elements.  Multivocal elements are elements within religious doctrine that can be used to help craft new practices and tolerance of democratic structures and struggles.  Without these multivocal elements, society will not be able to manage the necessary dialectic between secularism and religion and will thus be deadlocked, unable to successfully transition to democracy.  This will be a difficult task to achieve.  Fundamentalism, as we know, is alienative in that it distrusts, attacks and works to undermine established secular political institutions.  Whoever is not with me, is against me; compromise is abhorred.  How then, can this be achieved?
          The design of the political system creates the rules of the game.  Organizing political institutions is one way to begin to forge this new alliance.  Arend Lijphart in his essay Constitutional Design for Divided Societies offers some possible solutions.  He says, different groups can only be accommodated through power sharing, which requires the “participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making” (2004, 97).  He outlines a “one size” power-sharing model that fits well for most divided societies regardless of unique contexts.  I will quickly present a few of these recommendations.  He advocates proportional representation systems, so that all groups are treated equally.  The overriding principle here is never to exclude any significant group.  He prefers parliamentary systems as opposed to presidential because presidential systems tend to be majoritarian in nature and result in ‘winner-take-all’ outcomes.  Power sharing must be built into the executive, including having multiple languages and ethnicities.  He also advises for federalism and decentralized power.  This is an excellent way to provide autonomy and to avoid dominance by larger states on the federal level.  These mechanisms can provide institutional rules of the game that can shift towards cooperation and tolerance between differing ethnic and religious divides. 
The Role of Elites
          John Higley and Michael Burton assert that stable democracies depend greatly on the “consensual unity” of elites.  The internal relations of national elites are a strong determinant for democratic transitions and breakdowns.  Regime changes must be considered temporary unless accompanied by elite transformations, from disunity to consensual unity.  Elites are considered disunified when its members “(1) share few or no understandings about the properties or political conduct and (2) engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries.  The basic situation of persons composing this elite type is one of deep insecurity” (1989, 19).  The fear is that the other person, or other faction will gain the upper hand.  Members will then take extreme measures to defend their position, killing or imprisoning their enemies.  Stable regimes do not simply appear as the result of writing constitutions or holding elections.  The necessary step, they say, is the consensual unification of previously disunified elites.  If Sri Lanka had sufficient leadership in political parties and support from citizens, this theory would lead us to believe, that the conversation between disunified elites can begin to take place and reach what Higley and Burton call “elite settlement.”  Once this occurs, the political rules of the game can begin to be formed through other institutional means. 
Summary and Conclusion
Juergensmeyer believes that religious nationalisms all over the globe are creating a new synthesis of secular politics and religion. 
They are creating…a merger between the cultural identity and legitimacy of old religiously sanctioned monarchies and the democratic spirit and organizational unity of modern industrial society.  This combination can be incendiary, for it blends the absolutism of religion with the potency of modern politics.  Yet it may also be necessary, for without the legitimacy conferred by religion, the democratic process does not seem to work in some parts of the world.  In these places, it may be necessary for the essential elements of democracy to be conveyed in the vessels of new religious states (2003, 201-202).
Whether this is able to occur in Sri Lanka is another story and depends on a number of different factors.  The political culture itself needs to undergo a shift in order to provide meaning for its citizens in the secular and democratic process.  Institutional factors must also be addressed.  The electoral and representative systems must be tailored to foster a political environment of cooperation and mutual benefit.  The “twin tolerations” must evolve in order to begin the dialectic between secular and religious nationalisms.  The role of elites will also play a role in creating the necessary political climate for changes to be made.  In conclusion, the fundamentalisms in Sri Lanka are very complicated, and no single solution is apparent.  The new cold war continues to be waged. 

Resources

Martin E. Marty, R. Scott Appleby Eds. 1995. Fundamentalisms Comprehended. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. The New Religious State in Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Jul., 1995), pp. 379-391.

Geertz, Clifford. 1997. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

Higley, John; Burton, Michael G. The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns. In American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 1. (Feb., 1989), pp. 17-32.

Lijphart, Arend. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. In Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No.2. (April 2004). Pp96-107.

March, James G., Olsen, Johan P. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. 1984. pp.734-747.

Diamond, Larry, ed. 2005. The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the “Twin Tolerations”. pp. 213-253.

Stepan, Alfred. 2001. Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.